

Occupation Industrial Policy in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia using the example of Joint stock company for processing caustic potash in Kolín (Kaliwerke AG)

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The study briefly defines on selected features of the occupation policy, including its objectives within the territory of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia regarding industry. It notes the potential and actual economic significance of the German occupation of the Czech lands using the example of war production in Kolín. Selected German occupation administration measures within industry were illustrated using the example of Kaliwerke AG in Kolín. Previously unpublished archival documents at the State Regional Archives in Prague were used to analyse the increasing volume of Zyklon B production. It could not be shown that the Zyklon B produced in Kolín was used to kill people at concentration camps. Although production of Zyklon B at Kaliwerke AG had an increasing tendency during World War II, its share of the total volume was rather negligible.

[Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia; Kaliwerke AG; Zyklon B; War Production; Occupation Policy; Kolín]

The study² briefly defines on selected features of the occupation policy, including its objectives within the territory of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia regarding industry. The form of German occupation administration depended on a number of determinants, in particular the objectives of the occupation policy within the specific territory, the course of the war, the needs of the Nazi war economy, and also on the influence of selected occupation administration institutions and

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² The study was created from financial resources provided by the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic within the institutional support of the State Regional Archives in Prague.

ideologies, and implemented economic policy can be understood in various ways.³ According to Richard J. Overy, a dualism generally arose within the economy, because the local economy was preserved and was involved in the operation of the occupation administration.⁴ In Northern, Central (i.e. including the territory of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia) and Western Europe, were characterised according to Karl Brandt by a concept which involved more of a medium-term or long-term sustainability of developments and productivity within the occupied territory, including tolerance of a higher standard of living and a certain level of economic autonomy.⁵ The research is illustrated on selected enterprises in Kolín important for Germany's war industry. It focuses on the production of Zyklon B by Joint stock company for processing caustic potash in Kolín (Akciová společnost pro zpracování draselných louhů), including an analysis of its customer-supplier system. It makes use of previously unpublished archival documents from unprocessed funds of State Regional Archives in Prague. The study also notes the potential and actual economic significance of the German occupation of the Czech lands using the example of war production in Kolín.

Economic Goals of the Third Reich in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia

The German economy gradually began to operate on war economy principles from 1936 through implementation of the second four-year plan. Hitler, like the Wehrmacht leadership, drawing lessons from the First World War, realised that Germany had to be able to wage war using mainly its own resources, and needed to be able to endure a naval blockade.⁶ Economic resources could only be increased, in his opinion, by conquering European territory, or through co-operation, while foreign resources were necessary to support remilitarisation.⁷

³ For the nature of German economic policy and administration, see also K. FABIAN-KOVÁ – T. BURIANOVÁ, Okupační politika v průmyslu Protektorátu Čechy a Morava na příkladu Škodových závodů, in: *Politická ekonomie*, 63, 3, 2021, pp. 360–381, pp. 360–362.

⁴ R. J. OVERY, *The Economy of the German "New Order"*, in: R. J. OVERY (Hrsg.), *Die Neuordnung Europas. NS-Wirtschaftspolitik in den besetzten Gebieten*, Berlin 1997, pp. 11–28, p. 26.

⁵ K. BRANDT, *Management of Agriculture and Food in the German-occupied and Other Areas of Fortress Europe. A Study in Military Government*, Stanford 1953, pp. 6–8.

⁶ Z. JOHNSON, *Hospodářská politika Spojených států amerických a Německa 1933–1939*, Praha 2017, p. 283.

⁷ OVERY, p. 11.

The Nazi economy did not achieve the anticipated autarky in its second four-year plan in its military preparations, and the reasons for this included the structure of its economy and insufficient access to natural resources.⁸ It was one-third dependent on imports of strategic industrial raw materials, despite the practical implementation of new chemical and technological methods in heavy industry and costly substitute system businesses.⁹ From the mid-1930s, the labour market was a permanent problem for the German economy, because there was a shortage of labour and there was great upwards pressure on wages. Economic calculus was one of the impulses for occupation of the Czechoslovak territory.¹⁰ Some of the Nazis' principal economic interests included the utilisation of a qualified workforce, arming the German army and the use of local industrial enterprises' exports to acquire foreign currency. Sub-objectives also included controlling industrial subjects. In terms of Czechoslovak production capacities in industry, H. Göring considered the production of arms companies, exporting on the global market until occupation, to be of particular importance.¹¹

As an important industrial centre and railway hub, Kolín played an important role in the Nazis' war plans.¹² The town, known as the "Bohemian Manchester" gradually became the centre of the Central Elbe region, and not just because of the growth of industry and transport infrastructure, but also because it had many administrative, educational and cultural institutions. For Kolín factories, the Elbe as a direct connection to the port in Hamburg was always one of their most important routes.

For example, Czech joint stock company for refining kerosene (Česká akciová společnost pro rafinování petroleje), colloquially "Petrolka", was

⁸ K. FABIANKOVÁ, *Analýza hospodářsko-politických vztahů Německa a Sovětského svazu v letech 1939–1941*, Praha 2017, pp. 19–25.

⁹ H. SCHWENDEMANN, *Die wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem Deutschen Reich und der Sowjetunion vom 1939 bis 1941. Alternative zu Hitlers Ostprogramm?*, Berlin 1993, p. 73; LÄNDERRAT DES AMERIKANESCHEN BESATZUNGSGEBIETES, *Statistisches Handbuch von Deutschland 1928–1944*, München 1949, p. 408; G. THOMAS, *Geschichte der deutschen Wehr- und Rüstungswirtschaft (1918–1943/45)*, Boppard a. Rh. 1966, p. 186.

¹⁰ About the economic goals in the territory of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, see also FABIANKOVÁ – BURIANOVÁ, pp. 362–363.

¹¹ G. M. GILBERT, *Norimberský deník*, Praha 1971, p. 100.

¹² Z. JELÍNEK, *Nálety na Kolín za druhé světové války*, in: *Středočeský sborník historický*, 15, 1980, pp. 45–60, p. 45; Z. JELÍNEK, *Nacistická okupační správa na Kolínsku v letech 1939–1945*, in: *Práce muzea v Kolíně*, 3, 1984, pp. 199–229, p. 199.

founded in 1901 with capital of half a million Austrian crowns.¹³ It mainly produced kerosene for lighting, technical petrol, paraffin and asphalt. At the end of the 1920s, the business was bought by American company Vacuum Oil Company, which modernised it and expanded production. This was based on then-modern atmospheric vacuum distillation, enabling an increased volume of processed crude oil. The factory was one of the most modern businesses producing motor oils and lubricants to a comparable level to the rest of Europe. In the 1930–1935, the enterprise almost doubled its profit and was processing crude oil from Columbia, Venezuela, Romania, the USSR and the USA.¹⁴

In 1871, Joint stock manufacturer of fertilisers and chemical products (Akciová továrna na vyrábění umělých hnojiv a lučebnin) was founded. It manufactured superphosphates, sulphuric acid and other products.¹⁵ Pharmaceutical production, for example, was crucial and the most profitable sector for many years.

In 1900, the so-called Vozovka (Továrna na vozy a. s. Kolín) was founded, part of the Ringhoffer-Tatra, Praha Smíchov, a. s. group. The company was focused on the manufacture of agricultural vehicles and railway rolling stock. The factory prospered during the interwar period, almost tripling its profits, which grew from 312 406 CZK in 1919 to 883 618 CZK in 1939.¹⁶

Telephone sets including coils and poles for the Czechoslovak army began to be manufactured in the Prchal-Ericsson company (later Tesla) in 1936. Their colourful telephone sets were reliable and competitive on the European market. In 1937–1938, they also produced signalling equipment for Czechoslovak state railways. In April 1937, a building in Kolín was sold to Ideál Rádio Praha, and manufacturing was expanded to include capacitors for Microphona (Tesla Strašnice) and Telefunken (Tesla Pardubice).¹⁷

¹³ The application for registration in the commercial register and the first articles of association see also Státní oblastí archiv v Praze (hereafter SOA v Praze), NAD 47, Krajský soud obchodní Praha (hereafter KSO Praha), B-XI-180, box 1789.

¹⁴ In 1935 made a profit of 10 million CZK, see SOA v Praze, NAD 560, Vacuum Oil Company, a. s. (hereafter VOC), *Reports of the board of directors VOC a. s. in Prague for the business years 1930–1935*, box 58.

¹⁵ The application for registration in the commercial register and the first articles of association, see also SOA v Praze, KSO Praha, BX-XI-250, box 1943.

¹⁶ J. KRONUS, *150 let rozvoje kolínského průmyslu*, Kolín 1998, p. 63.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

Hitler planned to exploit the protectorate's economic potential mainly to arm the German army. He understood that this goal was only achievable if the occupation administration could maintain the economy's relative stability and function.¹⁸ Most representatives of the protectorate occupation administration and Reich representatives realised the geostrategic and economic potential of the protectorate land for the Reich's war economy, which is why long-term functionality of the administration was implemented with the needs of the Third Reich taken account of.¹⁹

Occupation Policy in the Industrial Sector

The economic situation of the Nazi economy, local conditions and the character of the occupation administration played a fundamental role in the approach to the occupation administration within the protectorate.²⁰ While in terms of long-term economic policy within the protectorate, Germanisation of the entire territory was determined as a priority, short-term economic policy was a subject of much dispute and was regularly modified, including in line with personnel changes within the leadership of the occupation administration itself.

The system in the protectorate had to be adapted to local conditions and was reformed several times. The purpose of the occupation administration was to create the impression of relative independence of Czech territory under German administration, and through central management without a more coherent concept to fulfil stated objectives (e.g. autarky, militarisation and Germanisation). The supreme body of the German occupation administration, which was also the supreme governing authority for the entire protectorate economy, was the Office of the Reich Protector, followed by a network of officers of central Reich economic institutions who worked at separate protectorate ministries and secured the smooth running of the occupied economy. Executive power fell within the competence of the supreme regional authorities,

¹⁸ K. HERMAN (eds.), *Sborník k problematice dějin imperialismu*, Vol. 21, Praha 1987, doc. No. 22, p. 73.

¹⁹ M. KÁRNÝ – J. MILOTOVÁ – M. KÁRNÁ (eds.), *Deutsche Politik im „Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren“ unter Reinhard Heydrich 1941–1942: eine Dokumentation*, Berlin 1997, pp. 107–122.

²⁰ For more on the occupation administration, see FABIANKOVÁ – BURIANOVÁ, pp. 364–365.

forming a dual Czech and German administration, which lasted until Heydrich's administrative reforms.²¹

Other defining traits of the protectorate's managed economy in industry included central wages management, labour force deployment and a general obligation to work, regulation of manufacturing, compulsory organisation of entrepreneurs, militarisation of the economy, and control of foreign trade and payment transactions. There was also an economic regulation of many commodities and the related rationing system in their supply.²² A key measure of occupation policy regarding releasing production capacities, raw materials and additional workforce was concentration of industry. Although the contribution of the Czech lands (protectorate lands and the Sudeten border area) within industrial employment in the Greater German Reich in 1941–1944 came to just 9–12%, this proportion grew overall much more than in other occupied areas, specifically by 40%. The war period saw an increase in protectorate employment across almost all strategic industrial sectors by 25–70%.²³

For the occupation administration, industry was included within the competency of the Reich Protector Office. The Central Industry Association for Bohemia and Moravia had an important role for the German administration, supervising sector organisations, and under which all industrial subjects had to be associated. It was also an association in which German influence was very quickly established. In line with laws in force, the association divided up production quotas and raw materials, determined production structure and made decisions on merging businesses.²⁴ Industrial companies lost the right to make decisions on production structure and volume, the workforce and intervene in price formation.²⁵

²¹ E. JANEČKOVÁ, *Státoprávní uspořádání Protektorátu Čechy a Morava (1939–1945)*, Plzeň 2013, p. 55.

²² F. VENCOSKÝ et al., *Dějiny bankovníctví v českých zemích*, Praha 1999, p. 216; V. PRŮCHA, Základní rysy válečného řízeného hospodářství v českých zemích v letech nacistické okupace, in: *Historie a vojenství*, 16, 2, 1967, pp. 215–239.

²³ C. A. RADICE, The Development of Industry, in: M. C. KASER – C. A. RADICE (eds.), *The Economic History of Eastern Europe 1919–1975. Interwar Policy, the War and Reconstruction*, Vol. II., Oxford 1986, pp. 416–451, pp. 421, 424.

²⁴ A. TEICHOVÁ, *Německá hospodářská politika v českých zemích v letech 1939–1945*, Praha 1998, pp. 15, 33–34.

²⁵ D. MUSILOVÁ, Problémy sociálně ekonomického vývoje v letech 1939–1945 v protektorátu Čechy a Morava (část 1), in: *Historický obzor*, 3, 5, 1992, pp. 149–152, p. 150.

The Oberlandrat oversaw war production, fulfilling its role within the defined territory. All lower authorities, posts and bodies were subject to the Oberlandrat within its region, except for military forces and the judiciary. They were not to undertake activities as a substitute for protectorate Czech authorities, but rather to control the activities of the Czech autonomous administration and demand the enforcement of German occupation interests.

During the period of military occupation administration, there were 35 Oberlandrats. The Kolín Oberlandrat district included the political districts of Kolín (Kolín and Kouřim judicial districts), Český Brod (Český Brod and Kostelec nad Černými lesy judicial districts), Kutná Hora (Kutná Hora and Uhlířské Janovice judicial districts), Čáslav (Čáslav and Habry judicial districts), Nový Bydžov (Chlumeč nad Cidlinou and Nový Bydžov judicial districts), Nymburk and Poděbrady (Městec Králové and Poděbrady judicial districts). Adjustments were later made to their territorial structure.²⁶

It was understood as an important link connecting Prague and Jihlava, and several factories important to the German war economy were based here. It was headquartered in the building of the former divisional headquarters at the corner of today's Pražská and Sokolská streets. Before the occupation, Reich German Herbert Eckoldt, an official at the Zwickau regional authority, was appointed to head the Oberlandrat.

As part of Heydrich's reform of public administration in 1942, the Kolín Oberlandrat was abolished and replaced with an authority of supreme district governors. Sudeten German, Wilhelm Hübner, was appointed German Kolín Governor, holding the post until the end of the war.²⁷ The Oberlandrats were referred to as inspectors of the Reich Protector. They led management and organisational activities only regarding certain offices of the occupation administration and Czech authorities of the time. Each district court had its own German division staffed exclusively by Germans.²⁸

Kolín was administered by the town board and town council, which met in the town hall. The Germans secured participation in town administration through appointment of local man of German nationality and Nazi

²⁶ JELÍNEK, *Nacistická okupační správa na Kolínsku*, pp. 205–208.

²⁷ J. PEJŠA, *Protektorátní Kolín jako německé město*, in: *Zpravodaj města Kolína*, 3/21, 23. března 2015, p. 18.

²⁸ JELÍNEK, *Nacistická okupační správa na Kolínsku*, pp. 207–208.

Party member, Max Teichel, clerk at Joint stock company for processing caustic potash in Kolín, to the town council by the District Authority in Kolín on 23 March 1941.²⁹

Germanisation of Industry

The Germanisation was enforced through a broad range of activities, and represented an integral component of occupation policy.³⁰ It was important in terms of the immediate fulfilment of Nazi economic objectives, i.e. the maximum exploitation of the protectorate economic potential for war needs, and effective integration into the German economy.³¹ In order to intensify German influence, a consistent pro-German personnel policy was launched, with persons of German nationality appointed into crucial sectors of the economy. In order control important industrial factories not just in the Kolín district, trustees – treuhänder – were often appointed to them.

Munitions factories, metal works, chemical and engineering plants, which even in the interwar period represented some of the most renowned producers and exporters in the world, were of greatest importance for the Nazi economy.³² The Germans also acquired influence through confiscated assets (e.g. from Jews), controlling state-owned enterprises, controlling banks with shares in industry, forced mergers with German groups and the forced issuance of new shares and repurchasing assets through associations in which industrial enterprises were involved.³³ Germanization and related Aryanization also affected some employees from Joint stock company for processing caustic potash in Kolín, who participated in the production of Zyklon B. Once the final Jews had been dismissed from the Board of Directors in 1941 and German majority was gradually achieved.³⁴

²⁹ Státní okresní archiv Kolín (hereafter SOkA Kolín), NAD 170, Archiv města Kolín, *Schůze městského zastupitelstva 1938–1942*, 18. dubna 1941, article 339, p. 402.

³⁰ For more on Germanisation in the protectorate, see FABIANKOVÁ – BURIANOVÁ, pp. 70–71.

³¹ D. JANČÍK – E. KUBŮ (eds.), *Nacionalismus zvaný hospodářský: střety a zápasy o nacionální emancipaci/převahu v českých zemích (1859–1945)*, Praha 2011, p. 567.

³² VENCOSKÝ et al., p. 256.

³³ D. BRANDES, *Češi pod německým protektorátem*, Praha 2000, pp. 197–198; M. MAZOWER, *Hitlerova říše: nacistická vláda v okupované Evropě*, Brno 2009, p. 290; TEICHOVÁ, p. 49; V. KRÁL, *Otázky hospodářského a sociálního vývoje v českých zemích v letech 1938–1945*, II., Praha 1958, p. 16.

³⁴ Technicians from mixed marriages were also employed here, such as Dr Strubel and Ing. Vogel. Were appointed to the board of directors for example E. Hocke and

Viktor Gráf, for example, plant chemist and renowned expert, was placed in the labour camp at Hagibor in 1944 and later transported to Terezín, which he survived. According to the extant memoirs of former employees, he committed suicide after the war in 1950 when he found out what the poisonous gas had been used for.³⁵ Another Jewish worker, Mr Jílovský, poisoned himself when he was to be arrested by the Gestapo.³⁶

Taking over management or acquiring influence in former Czechoslovak businesses also allowed the German administration to control and participate in companies which were abroad and set up new companies. By 1945, Germans owned almost 2.4 bn crowns in share capital, a tenfold increase compared to 1938.³⁷

War Production in Kolín

As the war became a total war, and the production capacity of the Reich arms industry was destroyed, the involvement of protectorate companies in arms production increased. This took place, based on a production decentralisation plan, and as such weapons production was less impacted by air strikes.³⁸ Kolín's railway hub was of great significance for ensuring consistent supplies to the Eastern Front especially. The Germans were extremely focused on ensuring maximum operation of all these factories and facilities.

Some Kolín factories were involved in the production of components for weapons and military material which were subsequently finished outside Protectorate territory.³⁹ One of Kolín's factories important for

Ing. K. Traunfellner, see SOA v Praze, NAD 646, Akciová společnost pro zpracování draselných louhů, Kolín (hereafter Draslovka Kolín a. s.), *Zajištění německých osob do správní rady 1941–1942*, inv. No. 31, *Úřední výpisy z obchodního rejstříku krajského soudu v Kutné Hoře z let 1940–1942*, inv. No. 30, box 4; *Změny ve správní radě k 31. 12. 1941, na základě nařízení říšského protektora o jmenování osob německé národnosti do správních rad akciových společností v Protektorátu, 1941–1942*, inv. No. 45, box 5.

³⁵ M. JOUZOVÁ – L. JOUZA (eds.), *Děti hledaly děti. Osudy židovských dětí na Kolínsku za holocaustu*, Kolín 2017, pp. 71–72.

³⁶ M. PLAVEC, *Výroba plynu Cyklon B v Kolíně*, in: M. HOŘEJŠ – I. LORENCOVÁ (eds.), *Věda a technika v českých zemích v období 2. světové války*, Praha 2009, pp. 326–335, p. 328.

³⁷ BRANDES, p. 357; KRÁL, p. 13.

³⁸ L. JOUZA – M. PLAVEC, *A země se chvěla. Nálety na Kolín za druhé světové války*, Cheb 2007, p. 47; L. HOVORKA, *Válečná výroba v Kolíně*, in: M. HOŘEJŠ – I. LORENCOVÁ (eds.), *Věda a technika v českých zemích v období 2. světové války*, Praha 2009, pp. 492–494, p. 492.

³⁹ V. PRŮCHA a kol., *Hospodářské a sociální dějiny Československa 1918–1992*, I, Brno 2004, pp. 476–479.

the war was mineral oil refinery Vacuum Oil Company,⁴⁰ which was incorporated into Hamburg's Deutsche Vacuum Oel Aktien-gesellschaft in 1939.⁴¹ After 1940, protection of oil for aircraft engines and fuel for the German army was set up at the factory site. Later, centrifugal gasoline deparaffinisation, hot clay refining and the production of plastic lubricants and lubricating greases were put into operation and fuelling stations and railway sidings were expanded.⁴²

The protectorate's chemicals and pharmaceuticals industry also prospered during the war. Besides Kaliwerke AG notable here is Chemische Kolín A. G. (Lučební závody a.s. Kolín), controlled by German capital. In 1939, despite the introduction of a managed economy, the factory registered many trademarks.⁴³ These included products for treating bronchitis, and veterinary medicines. Lučební Kolín's share price increased, as did almost their entire production of medicines, including veterinary medicines. Year-on-year, a comparison of 1939 and 1940 shows the volumes of Zoosan increased sevenfold, Vemkolin increased threefold, Zooklein doubled, and new product Zdravokol increased by 88.5%.⁴⁴ After 1941, the pharmaceutical division produced a large amount of Bioklein pastilles, Acylpirin and Acylkoffin against fever and pain.⁴⁵ Also implemented in the business was the production of parts for Junkers Ju 52 transport and bombing aircraft, putting the factory under military supervision, alongside the production of "smoke acid", which the Germans used as an obscuring agent during Allied air raids.⁴⁶ The production of sulphuric acid became crucial for the Nazi economy, and it had to be regularly

⁴⁰ The importance is demonstrated, for example, by overviews of the capacities and production of mineral oils in Czechoslovakia in the years 1935–1939, see SOA v Praze, VOC, boxes 45, 6.

⁴¹ Analyses and evaluations of oil extraction options within Czech territory from 1939, including maps and an overview of refineries see SOA v Praze, VOC, boxes 57, 6.

⁴² JOUZA, PLAVEC, p. 47; HOVORKA, p. 492; JELÍNEK, *Nálety na Kolín*, p. 45; examples of production trademarks from the war period, including Sphinx and photographs of filling stations from 1940 see SOA v Praze, VOC, boxes 63–64, 45.

⁴³ Examples of production patents, patent documents or preparation process see SOA v Praze, NAD 645, *Akciová továrna na výrobu umělých hnojiv a drasel, Kolín* (hereafter Lučební Kolín), boxes 7–10, 15, 38, 44.

⁴⁴ R. PÍŠA, *Kolínská lučební legenda: kniha k příležitosti 150. výročí založení podniku*, Praha 2021, pp. 259, 277.

⁴⁵ KRONUS, p. 53; Trademarks and patents of these products see SOA v Praze, Lučební Kolín, boxes 7–8, 10.

⁴⁶ PÍŠA, pp. 309–310; KRONUS, p. 53.

exported to the Reich. Under pressure from IG Farben chemicals group, progressive restrictions were placed on the production of not just sulphuric acid, which fell by 96 % between 1941 and 1945, but also of other chemical, pharmaceutical and cosmetics products, leading to a fall in overall gross profits.⁴⁷ 1943 was the final year that Akciové továrny na vyrábění lučebnin, Kolín operated independently, when arrangements came into force to transfer the production and sale of medicines in any form to Spolek pro chemickou a hutní výrobu in Rybitví.⁴⁸ As a consequence of the progressive concentration of the protectorate's chemicals industry, the factory was forced to merge with Pražské chemické závody in 1944.⁴⁹

Car factory a. s. Kolín, or also Vozovka, transferred to war production in 1943, producing goods and tank wagons for Reich German Railways (Deutsche Reichsbahn), as well as sWS (schwerer Wehrmachtschlepper) off-road tractor units. Kolín's Vozovka was not affected by the appointment of Germans to management roles, except for one member of the administrative board of Jewish origin, because it had already been controlled by German capital prior to the war. The wagons were produced in line with German plans, standards and production regulations. Tanker wagons ("WIFO") were designed for transporting diesel from the Caucasus, and as such they featured an adjustable undercarriage for use on Soviet gauge railway lines.⁵⁰ Of Vozovka's entire war production (500 sWSs were ordered), 100 sWSs were produced by May 1945, of which the Wehrmacht had received 23 units.⁵¹ In the final years of war, however, the production of railway wagons at the Ringhoffer Group, of which the Kolín factory was a component, was affected by problems arising from competition from Reich German companies.⁵² In the end, Vozovka registered total losses in May 1945 of 3 311 384 K (protectorate crowns), even though in the period 1940–1941 its profits had risen from 775 502 K to 910 460 K.⁵³ Unfinished vehicles, as well as drawings and material

⁴⁷ PÍŠA, pp. 281, 287.

⁴⁸ Property law matters during the transfer of the production of pharmaceutical goods, text of the convention from July of 1943, see SOA v Praze, Lučební Kolín, inv. No. 895, box 70.

⁴⁹ Documents on the merger of companies see SOA v Praze, Lučební Kolín, inv. No. 794, box 59.

⁵⁰ KRONUS, p. 64.

⁵¹ HOVORKA, pp. 490–491.

⁵² JOUZA – PLAVEC, p. 48; HOVORKA, p. 492.

⁵³ KRONUS, p. 65.

stocks for war production were later confiscated by the Red Army and taken to the Soviet Union. The total value of confiscated material came to 49 112 745.70 K, with the Red Army leaving a unique machine tool installed by the Germans in place.⁵⁴

The Prchal-Ericsson et al. (Prchal-Ericsson a spol.) radio engineering factory supplied field telephone exchanges, noise filters, throat microphones, extension cables and detonator relays for war use.⁵⁵ Báňská a hutní společnost was also involved in the arms programme, bought in 1940 by the Union bank in Prague, controlled by Germans, alongside other banks with French capital. The deciding shareholder in the now essentially German company was Deutsche Bank, and it also had close relations with Reichswerke Hermann Göring. One of the companies in its group was Pražská a. s. Báňské a hutní společnosti, with a factory in Kolín.⁵⁶ Kolín factory (division) ISOL produced insulation material (mineral wool), components for skid control gun brakes, and aircraft landing gear components and brass nozzles from German retaliatory weapons. Several smaller Kolín engineering plants were also involved in supplying the Reich military forces. Kolínská nástrojárna (Koliner Wergzeugfabrik) supplied drills to produce barrels. Navara factory (Továrna Navara) supplied shoes to the German army.⁵⁷

Joint Stock Company for Processing Caustic Potash in Kolín (Kaliwerke AG)

Joint stock company for processing caustic potash in Kolín was founded in 1906 with the participation of German capital from Frankfurt company Deutsche Gold und Silberscheidenanstalt. The factory was built in the industrial zone in the Kutna Hora suburb next to the distillery in Havličkova street, building no. 234.⁵⁸ In German, the company used the name Kaliwerke Aktiengesellschaft. Amongst the general public, it became more known under the name Draslovka.

⁵⁴ HOVORKA, pp. 490–491.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 492; KRONUS, p. 97.

⁵⁶ KRÁL, pp. 186–212.

⁵⁷ JOUZA – PLAVEC, p. 48; HOVORKA, p. 492.

⁵⁸ SOKA Kolín, *Stručné dějiny kolínských průmyslových závodů*, složka rukopisů, box 3; Business license, permission to build a factory and factory plans see SOA v Praze, Draslovka Kolín a.s., inv. No. 1, box 1; SOKA Kolín, Okresní úřad Kolín, inv. No. 815, box 531; Statutes of 1907 see Draslovka a.s., inv. No. 51, box 5.

The factory processed molasses waste from the distillery. Over time, the business focused on the production of potassium cyanide, ferrocyanides, liquid hydrogen cyanide, soot for rubber plants, ferrocyanide blue dye for the printing industry and ammonium sulphate, which was used as a fertiliser. Around 40 000 t of molasses residues were sent to the factory each year from many distilleries, with around 34 000 t of charcoal sent back to the distillery each year.⁵⁹ Potassium carbonate (potash) was extracted from the charcoal. It was in high demand from glassworks for its high quality, and it was also later exported, contributing to Czech glass's good reputation.

During the First World War, there were only five other factories of the same nature on the global market besides Kolín's Draslovka, specifically in Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, the USA and South Africa. Their total capacity, however, was far from able to meet global consumption.⁶⁰

Draslovka's main product was sodium cyanide, which was used in the extraction of gold and silver. In the 20s of the 20th century, there were experiments with the production of sodium cyanide briquettes and the associated research into a suitable packaging material that would enable export overseas.⁶¹ It was exported to North America and South Africa, where it was used in electrolytic gold extraction. There were also attempts made at making hydrocyanic acid from calcium cyanide. Correspondence with Dr. Jaroslav Heyrovský, later winner of the Nobel Prize for Chemistry, about the use of polarography in factory has also been preserved in the company archive.⁶²

Even during the interwar period, Draslovka was an important and successful chemical plant in Czechoslovakia and the world. For the Third Reich, it was also a valuable business.⁶³

Kaliwerke AG Ownership Structure and Customer-supplier System

Deutsche Gessellschaft für Schädlingsbekämpfung (Degesch), a company founded in 1920, owned the Zyklon B trademark and the right to its production. The first industrial production of poison gas was begun by the Dessauer Werke für Zucker und chemische Industrie (DZR) factory in the in the mid-1920s. The product was not distributed directly by

⁵⁹ KRONUS, p. 19.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 90.

⁶¹ SOA v Praze, Draslovka Kolín a. s., *Výroba a výzkum*, 1928, inv. No. 147, box 15.

⁶² Ibid., *Výroba a výzkum*, dopisy z 18. a 21. 9. 1939, inv. No. 153, box 16.

⁶³ J. KAMARÝT – L. KAMARÝT, *Jak v Kolíně bejvávalo*, Kolín 1996, p. 121.

Degesch, but via sales company Tesch & Stabenow Tesch, International Society for Pest Control Ltd. of Hamburg (Testa) and Heerdt-Lingler GmbH of Frankfurt (Heli) (See Attachment 1). Testa had a monopoly on sales north and east of the Elbe, including in Auschwitz, and from 1926 also in Czechoslovakia, while Heerdt-Lingler GmbH had the market west of the Elbe.⁶⁴ These two companies purchased products from Degesch. They ensured adequate supplies from manufacturers in Dessau and later also in Kolín, which were implemented either directly by customers, or else their own delivery company in the relevant areas. The principles of trading with Zyklon B were also confirmed during the Nuremberg Trials by Alfred Zaun, Testa's accountant.⁶⁵ Integration of production and sales was strengthened when Degesch became majority shareholder of Heli in 1931. From 1936, IG Farbenindustrie AG and Degussa Frankfurt am Main each owned 42.5% of Degesch shares, with the remaining 15% owned by Theo Goldschmidt's company – Konzern Essen. Degussa owned 6.7% of the Kolín factory's shares through Chemische Fabrik Schlempe GmbH of Frankfurt (See Attachment 1). Harman Schlosser, a Nazi Party member who became Deputy Chairman of the Board of Directors at Draslovka (Kaliwerke AG) in mid-1938, was promoted in November 1939 to Chairman of the Board of Directors at Degussa and in March 1942 became Chairman of the Board at Kaliwerke AG.⁶⁶ The General Director of Kaliwerke AG was Reich German, Max Stöcker.⁶⁷ In 1942, a branch of Degesch was set up in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in Prague, in which the Kaliwerke got involved (share: 51% Degesch, Frankfurt am Main, 49% Kaliwerke AG).⁶⁸

⁶⁴ Other shareholders in Testa were chemist Bruno Tesch, who was involved in developing Zyklon B, and trader Paul Stabenow. Heli was owned by former Director of Degesch, Welter Heerdt, as well as partner Fritz Haber, and formed Degesch General Director Johann Lingler. H. HUNGER, *Die Herstellung von Zyklon B in Dessau, FORSCHUNGSGRUPPE ZYKLON B* (Hrsg.), *Zyklon B. Die Produktion in Dessau und der Missbrauch durch die deutschen Faschisten*, Dessau 2007, pp. 11–122, p. 14, p. 56, pp. 31, 33, 36, 42; J. KALTHOFF – M. WERNER, *Die Händler des Zyklon B. Tesch & Stabenow, Eine Firmengeschichte zwischen Hamburg und Auschwitz*, Hamburg 1998, p. 95.

⁶⁵ O. KRAUS – E. KULKA, *Noc a mlha*, Praha 1958, pp. 281–283; JOUZA – PLAVEC, p. 51.

⁶⁶ HUNGER, pp. 14, 42.

⁶⁷ Part of personal materials, employment certificate and photos of Dr. Max Stoecker see SOA v Praze, Draslovka Kolín a.s., inv. No. 106–107, box 11.

⁶⁸ SOA v Praze, KSO Praha, C-XX-II-145, *Verzeichnis der Gesellschafter der Firma Degesch, Gessellschaft für Schädlingsbekämpfung m. b. H. in Prag*, 21. července 1942, box 2502.

The organisational structure in the trade in hydrocyanic acid, the main component in the production of Zyklon B, did not change during the war. The increased demand from the Wehrmacht and SS always had to be prioritised. Degesch's sales losses for 1939 were not very large, as they were compensated by orders from the Wehrmacht in German occupied lands. In contrast, consumption of Zyklon B grew rapidly. The Zyklon B export ban only applied to countries with a relatively low consumption, such as South Africa and Australia.⁶⁹

Despite the competitive situation, there were close business ties between all involved companies. In Poland alone, which was in Testa's sphere of influence, 36 t of Zyklon was used in 1939. In 1937, Testa sold just 27.4 t of Zyklon, while on the other hand Heli sold 41.7 t. In 1939, with Wehrmacht orders in Poland, the Sudetenland and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, the Hamburg company managed to sell 81.2 t of Zyklon, surpassing Heli (who sold 51.7 t).⁷⁰

The Beginning of Zyklon B Production at Kaliwerke AG and Its Development in the Interwar Period

By as early as 1925, Degussa was planning to produce Zyklon B at the Kaliwerke factory in Kolín, but conditions for production had not yet been met there. In mid-June 1933, General Director of the Kolín plant, Max Stöcker, wrote to Degussa, opening discussion on producing Zyklon in Kolín too. Degussa's director responded that due to shareholder changes in Degesch applicable from 1930, it would not be possible to set up other production sites in Czechoslovakia without the consent of the other shareholders, i.e. including IG Farben.⁷¹ The necessary production facilities were constructed in 1935. The factory in Kolín set up a small Zyklon plant with an initial production capacity of around 8 t/year. Over time, this was expanded such that during the war it was able to produce a maximum of 0.5 t per day, which nevertheless did not reach the production volume achieved by Dessau.⁷²

In 1935, Degesch signed an agreement with Kaliwerke to produce Zyklon B and hydrocyanic acid. This was followed by successful negotiations on additional sales areas in Austria, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania and

⁶⁹ KALTHOFF – WERNER, p. 105.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 106, 94.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 94.

Hungary.⁷³ The Kolín plant paid a licence fee of 1.50 RM to Degesch for each kilogram of Zyklon over the subsequent ten years. Testa accepted the agreement, which related to its sales territories, with one of its conditions being that it received half of these fees.⁷⁴

Thus from 1936,⁷⁵ Kaliwerke AG began producing Zyklon B (hydrocyanic acid, or also crystalline cyanogen). In this regard, the business asked the Kolín Regional Court for approval to build a disinfestation gas chamber.⁷⁶ This was essentially a modified vehicle equipped with circulating equipment, electric heating and ventilation.⁷⁷

According to the extant (archived) business documentation put together by Dr Viktor Grossmann,⁷⁸ a member of the management board, 4.325 t of Zyklon B were produced in Kolín, but the subsequent two years saw a fall in production by almost 75% to 1.622 t in 1937 and 1.397 t in 1938 (see Tab. 1). The average production costs for 1 kg of Zyklon B including packaging, without licensing fees, came to 42.18 CZK in 1936, with this figure growing to 60.96 CZK two years later.⁷⁹

Table 1. Zyklon B production at Kolín in 1936–1938 according to Dr Viktor Grossmann's data (in tonnes)

	KOLÍN (KALIWERKE AG) *)
1936	4.325
1937	1.622
1938	1.397

*) At Kaliwerke AG, the business year was from 1.1. to 1.1.

Source: SOA v Praze, Draslovka Kolín a. s., *Výroba a výrobní výlohy s Cyklonem B a kyanovodíkem v letech 1936–1938*, inv. No. 210, box 22.

⁷³ Ibid., pp. 106–107.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Production concession from April 1936 granted by the District Administration in Kolín, see SOA v Praze, Draslovka Kolín a. s., inv. No. 168, box 18.

⁷⁶ SOKA Kolín, Okresní úřad Kolín, *Žádost Akciové společnosti pro zpracování draselných louhů v Kolíně o živnostenské povolení ke stavbě dezinfekční plynové komory*, 8. září 1938, inv. No. 1069; *Nákres budovy s dezinfekční plynovou komorou z roku 1938*, inv. No. 1069, box 1360; SOA v Praze, Draslovka Kolín a. s., inv. No. 168, box 18.

⁷⁷ Bytová péče města Kolín, *Sociálně zdravotní péče na Kolínsku*, Kolín 1941, unpagged.

⁷⁸ Dr Ing. Viktor Grossmann was a member of Draslovka's management board until 1941, after which time he was transported to Terezín and Auschwitz because of his Jewish origins.

⁷⁹ SOA v Praze, Draslovka Kolín a. s., *Výroba a výrobní výlohy s Cyklonem B a kyanovodíkem v letech 1936–1938*, inv. No. 210, box 22.

Alfred Güllemann from DZR produced in July 1948 to provide a more long-term overview of Zyklon B production in Dessau.⁸⁰ Production of Zyklon B at Dessau remained at a roughly stable level from 1936–1939. In the 1935/1936 business year 158.78 t of the poisonous gas were produced, and this figure was 158.65 t in the 1938/1939 year.⁸¹ Although we are comparing data from different business years, we can say that Kaliwerke AG's proportion of total production was negligible prior to the start of the Second World War, comprising less than 1%.

This gas from Kolín was solely used for disinfection and the eradication of pests, rodents and insects, as documented not just by advertisements in the regional press at the time, but also extant business archival documents in the form of advertising brochures, spray tests and orders from various entities within agriculture, the food industry, services and healthcare (see Attachment 2).⁸²

Kaliwerke AG Production of Zyklon B and Consumption during the Second Word War

During the Second Word war, Kaliwerke AG also produced sodium cyanide, soot, charcoal and calcium cyanide salt. Zyklon B was used to ensure soldiers were capable of combat, and to disinfect stolen objects and clothes from occupied lands or from concentration and POW camps. The start of the war saw an increase in demand for Zyklon B to disinfect large areas, such as barracks, military hospitals, military camps and ships. It was particularly important in the battle against typhus, transmitted by lice on clothing.⁸³ The Kolín regional press featured advertisements offering the direct sale of Zyklon B, or services related to the disinfection of households.⁸⁴ Reich railways (Reichsbahn) needed around 20–30 t of hydrocyanic acid in order to disinfect passenger trains.⁸⁵ In 1943,

⁸⁰ HUNGER, pp. 92–93.

⁸¹ Business year in DZR were from September 1 to August 31.

⁸² For example, see also SOA v Praze, Draslovka Kolín a. s., *Výroba, organizace, charakter, nabídky Draslovky na desinfekční účely cyklonu B potravinářským a jiným závodům*, 1936–1938, inv. No. 179, box 19; *Polabská stráž*, 28. října 1938; *Hlas demokracie*, No. 43, 26. října 1937, p. 21; J. ŽÁK, Hubení škůdců ve mlýně, in: *Mlynář*, 57, 24, 12. června 1936, p. 281.

⁸³ HUNGER, p. 18; SOA v Praze, Draslovka Kolín a. s., *Dezinfekce a postřikovací zkoušky s Cyklonem B u různých organizací*, 1936–1944, inv. No. 359, box 38.

⁸⁴ See newspaper *Naše Pravda*, 26. dubna 1940.

⁸⁵ HUNGER, p. 30.

Degesch's Prague subsidiary offered protective filters for working with Zyklon B for 40 K per item.⁸⁶

During the war, the raw ingredients for Zyklon B production became extremely rare. Even so, comparing the final peacetime business year of 1937/1938 and 1942/1943, when production reached a peak, shows that production increased significantly. According to Dr Viktor Grossmann's extant business documentation, Zyklon B's production volume doubled in 1939–1941, specifically from 6.584 t to 13.328 t. In 1942, production almost tripled (see Tab. 2). The average production costs for 1 kg of Zyklon B including packaging, without licensing fees, came to 33.46 CZK in 1938, with this figure falling two years later to 28.51 K.⁸⁷ The total net profit for the Zyklon B produced by the Kolín factory in 1941 came to 339 226.56 K.⁸⁸

Table 2. Zyklon B production at Kolín in 1939–1942 according to Dr Viktor Grossmann's data (in tonnes)

	KOLÍN (KALIWERKE AG) *)
1939	6.574
1940	8.899
1941	13.328
1942**)	30.569

*) At Kaliwerke AG, the business year was from 1.1. to 1.1.

**) from 1.1. 1942 to 31.12. 1942

Source: SOA v Praze, Draslavka Kolín a. s., inv. No. 210, box 22;

Bilanční vyúčtování k 31. 12. 1942, inv. No. 27, box 4.

The importance of Zyklon B production in Kolín can also be demonstrated by comparing it with production in DZR. We have data of production from documents of Max Stöcker from 1944 and Alfred Güllemann from 1948.⁸⁹ According to Alfred Güllemann, 305.2 t of Zyklon B was produced in Dessau in the 1941/1942 business year (from September 1.

⁸⁶ SOA v Praze, Draslavka Kolín a. s., *Výroba-organizace, charakter, rozesílka Cyklonu B jednotlivým firmám, obchodní korespondence z 1942–1943*, inv. No. 186, box 20.

⁸⁷ SOA v Praze, Draslavka Kolín a. s., *Výroba a výrobní výlohy s Cyklonem B a kyanovodíkem v letech 1939–1941*, inv. No. 210, box 22.

⁸⁸ SOA v Praze, Draslavka Kolín a. s., *Výroba a výrobní výlohy s Cyklonem B a kyanovodíkem v roce 1941*, inv. No. 210, box 22.

⁸⁹ HUNGER, pp. 92–93.

to August 31). In the subsequent business year production increased to 359.2 t of Zyklon B, representing an increase of 17% compared to the previous year, and an increase of as much as 126.5% compared to the 1938/1939 year.⁹⁰ In contrast to Güllemann, Max Stöcker likely did not count production for a particular business year, but rather for calendar years. It is evident from the table (Tab. 3) that annual production of Zyklon B at Kolín increased from 13.3 t in 1941 to 58.4 t in 1943. Kolín production in 1941–1943 covered roughly a tenth of total production that we are aware of, while we do not know the production figures at the French factory.⁹¹ In 1943 (total of 457.6 t), around 13% of the total volume was produced in Kolín.

Table 3. Zyklon B production at Kolín in 1941–1943 compared to production at Dessau according to Max Stöcker's data (in tonnes)

	KOLÍN (Kaliwerke AG)	DESSAU (DZR)
1941	13.3	208.6
1942	30.5	315.6
1943	58.4	399.2

Source: HUNGER, p. 92.

In 1943 SS figures turned up at the factory and demanded that all Zyklon B stocks be given to them. Even though Director Max Stöcker refused to comply, 4.5 t were still seized.⁹² Gross turnover from Zyklon B production in the Kolín factory would have reached roughly 5 11 000 RM in 1941 to 1943.⁹³

Sale of Cyclone B through Degesch reached their highest level in 1943 at 411 t (see Tab. 4). It is highly likely that these figures for Degesch also include production volumes from Kolín.⁹⁴ This sales data does not line up with annual production volumes, because storage may have resulted in delays between production and sale.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 92.

⁹¹ Ibid., pp. 92–93.

⁹² Ibid., p. 42

⁹³ PLAVEC, p. 329; HUNGER, p. 18.

⁹⁴ HUNGER, p. 91.

Table 4. Overview of Zyklon B sales in 1939–1944 through Degesch (in tonnes)

1939	180
1940	242
1941	194
1942	321
1943	411
1944	231

Source: HUNGER, p. 91.

The year 1942 was also a very successful year for Degesch. Sales that year reached a record maximum of 1 664 000 RM (compared to 1941, when sales came to 1 014 000 RM): thus sales had increased by 64% compared to the previous year. Because production in the factories in Dessau and Kolín remained unrestricted, increased orders could be met without any major backlogs. In the year looked at, around 8 t was consumed just in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.⁹⁵ Degesch and Degussa raked in profits from the production and sale of Zyklon B. Sales volumes increased during the years of war to 3–4 times the demand in peacetime.⁹⁶

Higher sales were also related to the fact that forced labourers from countries occupied by Germany were used in the arms industry, and because of the poor hygiene in camps their clothes were contaminated by pests. Special de-licing measures were required, because many foreign workers were put into the arms industry.⁹⁷ Innovations and technical modifications implemented in production also helped.

There were significant problems during the war with satisfying the increasing demand for hydrocyanic acid (integral component of Zyklon B). The requirements of the Wehrmacht and SS for this pesticide had to be prioritised. The demand from the Wehrmacht, SS and arms industry was calculated in 1944 at 80 t, specifically 20 t for delousing arms industry systems (compared to 12 t for 1943); 10 t for delousing Waffen-SS systems (compared to 4.5 t for 1943); and 50 t for delousing Wehrmacht systems

⁹⁵ KALTHOFF – WERNER, pp. 120–121.

⁹⁶ HUNGER, p. 18.

⁹⁷ KALTHOFF – WERNER, p. 121.

(compared to 38 t for 1943).⁹⁸ There was a reduction in planned supply capacity at Kaliwerke AG Kolin of 30–40 %.⁹⁹ This is one reason why export limits to German-occupied areas of Finland, Romania and Serbia were increased, mainly at the expense of trade with neutral countries.¹⁰⁰

Supplies of Zyklon B to Concentration Camps including from Kaliwerke AG

People were murdered using Zyklon B primarily in Auschwitz and Majdanek. The first mass murder of people in a gas chamber took place in early September 1941 in Auschwitz. Its victims were Polish and Soviet prisoners of war.¹⁰¹ In the Mauthausen, Sachsenhausen and Ravensbrück concentration camps, the gas chambers built were smaller.

Data from Testa's accountant, Alfred Zaun, a company which took products from DZR and Draslovka, can be used to demonstrate additional volumes of Zyklon B gas sold in 1942 and 1943, including supplies to Auschwitz (see Tab. 5).

Table 5. Volume of Zyklon B gas sold in 1942–1943 by Testa (in tonnes, approx.)

	1942	1943
Total volume of Zyklon B gas sold	79.7	119.5
Of which to concentration camps	9.1	18.3
Of which to Auschwitz concentration camp	7.5	12.2

Source: HUNGER, p. 35.

Alfred Zaun submitted documents according to which the SS, Wehrmacht and concentration camps took around 40 t of Zyklon B from Testa in 1941, around 80 t in 1942, almost 114.5 t in 1943 and around 27 t of Zyklon B gas in 1944.¹⁰² Orders from Testa were increasingly large. In 1942–1943 alone, Auschwitz concentration camp ordered 19 t. Testa also supplies Zyklon B produced in Dessau, and from 1935/36 also in Kolín for other concentration camps such as Auschwitz-Birkenau, Sachsenhausen,

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 126.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p.128.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 127.

¹⁰¹ KRAUS – KULKA, p. 279; KALTHOFF – WERNER, p. 174.

¹⁰² KRAUS – KULKA, pp. 279, 281–283.

Majdanek and Dachau.¹⁰³ In 1944, Auschwitz concentration camp received 1,9 t, SS units and other concentration camps received 6.9 t and the SS Central Medical Camp received 1.7 t, although this does not include supplies to Auschwitz and Oranienburg.¹⁰⁴ From June 1943 to May 1944, the DZR sent around 3.8 t to Auschwitz.¹⁰⁵ At the end of April 1943, Zyklon B in 270 tins with a volume of 84 kg to a total value of 1 661.40 RM was sent from the Kolín factory by rail to Mauthausen camp.¹⁰⁶ Around 5 to 7 kg of Zyklon was needed for the mass murder of 15 000 people.¹⁰⁷ In April 1948, Max Stöcker emphasised that he did not at that time suspect that the deliveries of poisonous gas were being used to kill people.¹⁰⁸

In some concentration camps, including Dachau, Theresienstadt, Buchenwald and Groft-Rosen, Zyklon B was only used for disinfection purposes. Degesch's Prague branch was responsible for the concentration camp in Terezín (Theresienstadt). According to extant business correspondence, between 11 February 1943 and 5 April 1943, a total of 32 tins were supplied to Terezín (Befehlhaber der Sicherheitsdienst Polizei) from Draslovka in Kolín for 7 527 RM, inclusive of packaging and railway transport.¹⁰⁹

According to German sources monthly supplies of up to 400 kilograms were sent out from 1944 directly from Draslovka in Kolín.¹¹⁰ In February 1945, the prisoners were forced to build a gas chamber at the Small Fortress in Theresienstadt. The impending end of the war meant these plans could not be completed.¹¹¹

Based on the research of selected company documentation stored in the State Regional Archives in Prague, it has not been clearly proven that Zyklon B made in Kolín was used to kill people. Mass murders were

¹⁰³ HUNGER, p. 35.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 36.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 39.

¹⁰⁶ A. TIETZ, *Die Anwendung des Zyklon B in den faschistischen Konzentrationslagern*, FORSCHUNGSGRUPPE ZYKLON B (Hrsg.), *Zyklon B. Die Produktion in Dessau und der Missbrauch durch die deutschen Faschisten*, Dessau 2007, pp. 123–162, p. 143; HUNGER, p. 131.

¹⁰⁷ JOUZA – PLAVEC, p. 51.

¹⁰⁸ KALTHOFF – WERNER, pp. 187–188.

¹⁰⁹ SOA v Praze, Draslovka Kolín a. s., *Výroba-organizace, charakter, rozesílka Cyklonu B jednotlivým firmám, obchodní korespondence z let 1942–1943*, inv. No. 186, box 20.

¹¹⁰ TIETZ, p. 160; KALTHOFF – WERNER, p. 199.

¹¹¹ PLAVEC, p. 333.

committed using engine exhaust fumes at the death camps of Belzec and Treblinka where the product was exported in 1942, not Zyklon B.¹¹²

The production of Zyklon B was influenced by air raids on Kolín at the end of the war. Extant archive documents suggest that in the period from 15 March 1939 to 30 March 1943, 43 air hazards and 19 alarms were progressively declared.¹¹³ There were air raids on Kolín four times, on 24 August 1944, 28 December 1944, 15 March 1945 with the last raid taking place on 18 April 1945. It wasn't just the industrial zone where there were businesses involved in the Reich's arms industry that were damaged, but so were bridges, railway stations, residential buildings, playgrounds, churches and cemeteries.¹¹⁴

Kolín's Draslovka was put out of business in the April 1945 air raid, mainly due to its position near the railway station. Although an air defence system and Zyklon station protective reinforced concrete shelter were built for the business,¹¹⁵ all that was left was the boiler room and some chimneys. The complete company archive, containing important documents, was not preserved either.¹¹⁶ The total damage to property, mainly buildings, equipment and supplies, was provisionally estimated at around 46 150 000 K.¹¹⁷ After initial necessary reconstruction, the production of the factory was restarted in 1947.¹¹⁸ Former Director Max Stöcker confirmed in 1948 that the offices, retail area and rest of the factory were heavily damaged. He said that that day everything was hastily packed up,

¹¹² KALTHOFF – WERNER, p. 165.

¹¹³ SOkA Kolín, Archiv města Kolína F, *Záznamy protiletectké obrany 1942–1945*, unpagged, box 39.

¹¹⁴ About property damage and the number of dead see SOkA Kolín, fond Archiv města Kolín F, *CPO-Civilní protiletectká obrana, Konečné zprávy o náletech nepřátelských letadel na Kolín z let 1944–1945*.

¹¹⁵ For more on design documentation, including drawings see SOA v Praze, Draslovka Kolín a.s., *Technická dokumentace: stavby – protiletectké opatření pro cyklonovou stanici z 1944*, inv. No. 312, *Technická dokumentace: stavby – protiletectká ochrana v závodě, výstavba krytů organizace protiletectkých opatření z 1944*, inv. No. 315, box 32.

¹¹⁶ SOkA Kolín, *Stručné dějiny kolínských průmyslových závodů, složka rukopisů*, box 3, unpagged.

¹¹⁷ SOA v Praze, Draslovka Kolín a.s., *Protokol o mimořádné schůzi správní rady Akciové společnosti pro zpracování draselných louhů ze dne 30. 4. 1945*, pp. 1–5, p. 3, inv. No. 386, box 42.

¹¹⁸ Estimates of selected reconstruction costs (mainly construction and investment), machinery budget, loan applications and additional manpower from 1945 and 1946 and technical documentation and authorization see SOA v Praze, Draslovka Kolín a.s., inv. No. 73, box 8; inv. No 227, box 24, inv. No. 310, box 32, inv. No. 319, box 33.

and many Zyklon B tins were taken away by car, with the stock at that time coming to around 4 t.¹¹⁹ According to preserved official accounting documents from the company archive, Zyklon B stocks at the end of 1945 amounted to 160.5 kg.¹²⁰

Conclusion

The concept of the German occupation policy within the territory of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia took account of German policy's long-term and short-term objectives. From a long-term perspective, the objective of the administration was to Germanise the occupied territory, but during the initial years this was outweighed in occupation policy by the importance of exploiting the economic potential of the protectorate territory for the needs of the German war economy. Within industry, the occupation administration proceeded to take control of industry to Germanise it.

Selected German occupation administration measures within industry were illustrated using the example of Joint stock company for processing caustic potash in Kolín (Kaliwerke AG). Previously unpublished archival documents at the State Regional Archives in Prague were used to analyse the volume of Zyklon B production. A customer-supplier system connected to the German economy was defined. Based on archives stored at State Regional Archives in Prague could not be shown that the Zyklon B produced in Kolín was used to kill people at concentration camps. Although production of Zyklon B at Kaliwerke AG had an increasing tendency during World War II, its share of the total volume was rather negligible.


The German occupation policy concept and the measures this involved were also significant in terms of their subsequent use and how they were built on during the post-war restoration of Czechoslovakia. State interventions, which began within industry as early as in 1945, continued with the nationalisation of crucial enterprises and economic planning. Within industry, governing organisations were set up for individual sectors in the form of national enterprises which corresponded significantly to the arrangement of associations established during the period of German occupation. Production was also concentrated through mergers into

¹¹⁹ KALTHOFF – WERNER, p. 188.

¹²⁰ SOA v Praze, Draslovka Kolín a.s., *Majetková sestava k 31. 12. 1945, Účet ztráty a zisku k 31. 12. 1945 fy národní podnik – Akciová společnost pro zpracování draselných louhů v Kolíně*, inv. No. 227, box 24.

larger national enterprises. In 1948, a further wave of nationalisations took place, industry was reorganised, and a system of five-year planning was set up. In 1946 the national enterprise Joint stock company for processing caustic potash in Kolín was incorporated into the Synthesia chemicals group. The heir to the original factory is today's joint stock company, Lučební závody Draslovka a. s. Kolín.

Attachment 1. Zyklon B Customer-Supplier System



Source: HUNGR, p. 15; KALTHOFF – WERNER, p. 120.

Attachment 2. Advertisement for Zyklon B from the second half of the 1930s

BEZ ZVĚTŠENÍ JSOU DOCELA MALÍ,

ale škody jimi způsobené jsou tak značné, že mohou ohroziti i prosperitu velikých mlýnů.

**Kyanovodíkový přípravek
CYKLON B**

jest v odborných kruzích označován za nejúčinnější prostředek pro hubení všeho škodlivého živočišstva. V mlýnech osvědčuje se CYKLON B jako jediný spolehlivý přípravek proti všem škůdcům mouky a obilí, moučným molům, moučným broukům, pilousům, myším, krysám a t. d. CYKLON B vyhubí tyto škůdce dokonale ve všech vývojových fázích – t. j. včetně zárodků, takže po čístce provedené CYKLONEM B jest dosaženo v každém mlýně takové čistoty, jakou lze naléztí jinak jen v nových mlýnech v prvním provozním roce.



Jediným použitím CYKLONU B jsou zanešená strojní zařízení zbavena molů a pavučin na několik let. CYKLON B nemá v žádném směru škodlivého vlivu na jakost mouky a obilí. Peníz vynaložený na CYKLONOVOU čístku jest výdaj naprosto produktivní a lze proto bezpečně očekávati, že naši

**POKROKOVÍ MLÝNÁŘI POUŽIJÍ VE VLASTNÍM ZÁJMU
V BOJI PROTI ŠKODLIVÉMU ŽIVOČIŠTVU V MLÝNECH VÝHRADNĚ
CYKLON B.**



Čistotou bude zářiti mlýn po použití CYKLONU B k radosti a prospěchu každého mlýnáře a konsument dá jistě přednost bezvadné mouce z čistého mlýna.

Dokonalé vyčištění mlýnů provádí

Akciová společnost pro zpracování draselnatých louhů v Kolíně, jediný výrobce CYKLONU B v tuzemsku.

Pracovala v Československu jako první s kyanovodíkem. – Díky svým bohatým zkušenostem jest proto jmenovaný kolínský závod, který disponuje celou řadou odborných inženýrů, nejpopovolanější institucí pro otázky průmyslové hygieny.

Vážní zájemci obdrží na požádání podrobné a nezávazné nabídky.

Source: SOA v Praze, Draslavka Kolín a. s., *Nákuř – odbyť. Prospekty na dezinfekční funkci Cyklonu B, 1935–1938*, inv. No. 141, box 14.